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  Jeffrey Downard
Abstract
In this paper, I examine Melville's discussion in Moby Dick of
the whiteness of the whale from the perspective of a Kantian
account of the sublime. My aim, in the first instance, is to see
if the comparison helps to shed light on Melville's puzzling
discussion of the color white and why this color serves to
heighten the feeling of being overwhelmed by terror when
confronted with something extremely large or powerful. In
turn, I intend to use Melville's discussion of whiteness to put
pressure on some of the philosophical assumptions behind a
Kantian analysis of the sublime. In particular, I hope to show
that Melville's account of the war between Captain Ahab and
the great white whale can serve as an aesthetic
counterexample to the Kantian claim that both generals and
war are sublime-but only if the general possesses civic virtue
and the war is conducted in a just manner. I will attempt to
use this counterexample to challenge the philosophical
assumption that the power of reason is the basis of our
nobility in the experience of the sublime, for this assumption is
behind those contemporary accounts of the sublime that have
been motivated by the Kantian analysis. As a result, the
argument of this paper is an attempt to offer philosophical
support to the efforts of those contemporary artists who, like
Robert Motherwell, draw inspiration from Melville's discussion
of the color white.
Key Words
aesthetics, sublime, beauty, reason, imagination, Moby Dick,
Melville, Kant, morality, humanity

1. Introduction
In a 1952 essay on the American Action Painters, Harold
Rosenberg claims that "the American vanguard painter took to
the white expanse of the canvas as Melville's Ishmael took to
the sea."[1] One of the reasons Moby Dick was important for
this generation of artists is that the novel engages in an
ongoing debate between artists and philosophers concerning
the proper understanding of the aesthetics of those things that
seem to make us feel small and powerless. Melville's Moby
Dick is rife with symbolism designed to evoke the experience
of the sublime.[2] For example, there is the endless globecircling of the whaling voyages, the imperturbable depths of
the ocean, and the enormous power of the great white whale.
In a central chapter entitled "The Whiteness of the Whale,"
Ishmael, the narrator of the story, uses examples such as the
whiteness of the polar bear, the artic albatross, and the great
steed of the prairies to explain why it is the color of the whale
that evokes in him feelings of terror. The aim of this paper is
to compare Melville's literary discussion of the whiteness of
the whale with a philosophical analysis of the sublime.
In making this comparison, I intend to draw on a Kantian
account of the sublime, and I have a number of reasons for
using this account as a framework for the discussion.[3] First,

Kant's aesthetics was enormously influential both in
philosophical circles and in literary circles during the period
when Melville was working as a writer. Second, Melville makes
a number of direct references to the Kantian philosophyincluding his aesthetics--over the course of the novel. These
facts lead me to believe that Melville's many examples of
sublimity, and in particular his discussion of the color of the
whale, might profitably be read in light of a Kantian account of
the aesthetics of the sublime.
In addition to shedding some light on Melville's rather puzzling
chapter, I have an additional motive for comparing the
discussion of the whiteness of the whale to Kant's analysis of
the sublime. I hope to show that certain features of Melville's
discussion can be used to raise a philosophical objection to the
Kantian account. In particular, Kant argues that it is our
rational humanity that enables us to remain undaunted in the
face of those things that threaten to overpower us. In
Melville's discussion of the whiteness of the whale, it is the
fact that the color white simultaneously stands for what is
most noble and pure, and at the same time also stands for
what is most deadly that is the source of the special terror that
Ishmael claims to experience when confronted with Moby Dick.
In this paper, I will attempt to show that Melville's account can
be used to put pressure on some of the philosophical
assumptions behind Kant's account. In turn, these same
considerations should give us reason to rethink some of the
terms of the contemporary debate about the aesthetics of the
sublime-especially those parts of the contemporary debate
that have been shaped by Kantian assumptions.[4]
2. The Whiteness of the Whale
Melville's chapter on the whiteness of the whale directly
follows a chapter entitled "Moby Dick." In the earlier chapter,
Melville tells the reader what the whale symbolizes to Ahab,
the captain of the ship and the primary agent behind the hunt
for the great white whale. In the latter chapter, Melville tells
the reader what the whale symbolizes to Ishmael, a member
of the crew who works before the mast and takes his orders
from the captain. In order to understand why it is the
whiteness of the whale that causes Ishmael such dread, we
should start with a brief account of what the whale means to
Ahab.
Captain Ahab tells his crew that he is no stranger to the great
white whale. In fact, on a previous voyage, they met in deadly
combat, the direct result of which was the loss of his leg.
Having suffered such a terrible physical loss, Ahab lay for
many weeks in delirium as the ship rounded the Horn and
headed for home. The narrator of the story tells us that, as
Captain Ahab lay in his bed, his "torn body and gashed soul
bled into one another; and so interfusing, made him mad."[5]
In time, Ahab's madness became concentrated upon the
whale. The result was that Ahab now had a "thousand fold
more potency" than before.
One might, like Starbuck, the first mate, think that it is more
than just madness to seek revenge against a dumb animal
such as a whale. After all, it seems preposterous to suppose
that Moby Dick acted out of anything other than blind instinct.
In his attempt to bind the crew to his end, Ahab explains his

purpose in hunting the whale. On Ahab's view, the whale is
more than just a dumb brute. On the contrary, all visible
things are "pasteboard masks" from behind which some
"unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth his features. . . .
" If a man is to land a blow against that unknown thing, he
must "strike through the mask." Ahab admits that, at times,
he thinks there might not be anything behind the mask.
Nevertheless, for Ahab, the great white whale stands for
"outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it."
And this forms the basis of the pact between Ahab and the
rest of the crew. Starbuck thinks it is blasphemy to seek
vengeance against one of God's creations. But Ahab could care
less about such concerns:
Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I'd strike the
sun if it insulted me. For could the sun do that,
then could I do the other; since there is a sort of
fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all
creation. But not my master, man, is even that
fair play. Who's over me? Truth hath no confines.
(ch. 36)
Such is the basis of Ahab's madness. Melville reminds us that
there is a fine line between the kind of madness that
manifests itself as insanity, and madness that exhibits the
special powers of genius. For example, in the Phaedrus, Plato
draws an analogy between the special form of madness that is
exhibited in augury and prophecy, and the inspiration that a
poet exhibits when giving a beautiful speech.[6] Melville
appears to have a similar idea in mind when he explicitly
refers to Plato and then draws an analogy between Ahab's
madness and his special genius. Ahab's attempt to seek
revenge against the supernatural powers that lie behind the
mask is analogous to Prometheus's attempt to seek revenge
against Zeus. In defiance of Zeus' command not aid human
beings, Prometheus has given human beings fire and many
other gifts. In turn, Zeus has decided to punish Prometheus by
chaining him to a rock and commanding Moira to peck at his
liver-despite the fact that Zeus and the other Olympians were
able to overthrow the Titans only with the help of Prometheus'
foresight.[7]
What Moby Dick means to Ahab is the personification of the
impersonal powers in nature. The purpose in seeking revenge
against these unjust powers is to take the case of man to bar.
Insofar as Ishmael has, like the rest of the crew, formed a
pact with Ahab, he too is committed to the pursuit of the white
whale. But what the whale means to Ishmael is something
different from what it means to Ahab. In order to explain why
it is the whiteness of the whale that he finds so appalling, he
begins with a list of examples of the more noble things that
white has come to symbolize. Generally speaking, whiteness
tends to enhance the beauty of natural objects. For example,
the beauty of pearls, marble and japonica is, in each case,
enhanced by their white color.
In many different cultures, at many different times, white has
been emblematic of nobility. For example, in the sixteenth
century the kings in the capital of Burma used the title "Lord
of the White Elephants" as a symbol of their royalty, and the
modern kings of Siam employed the same animal as their

symbol. The flag of the Hanoverian kingdom bears the figure
of a snow-white horse, and white was the imperial color of the
Austrian empire. It is the color of the innocence of the virgin
bride, a symbol of joy for the Romans, of honor for the
American natives, and of justice in the legal systems of
Europe. The white forked flame was held to be holiest by the
Persian fire worshippers, in Greek mythology Jove was made
incarnate in the form of a snow-white bull and, in Catholic
ritual white robes are worn by priests and given to those who
are redeemed.
What Ishmael finds puzzling is that the very same color that
evokes such feelings of joy, innocence, holiness, and justice,
also serves to heighten the feelings of terror when conjoined
with something terrible. Once again, Ishmael starts with a list
of examples, including the whiteness of the polar bear and the
great white shark. Why, asks Ishmael, does the color of these
animals serve to heighten the terror we experience when we
imagine confronting such dangerous creatures? There is
something about the ghastly color of the bear and the shark
that makes them seem more terrible than other dangerous
creatures, such as the Bengal tiger. Consider the arctic
albatross, made famous in Coleridge's "Rhyme of the Ancient
Mariner," or the white steed of the prairies. The former stands
to the seafaring man as the latter stands to the plains Indians.
For both, they are the object of the highest reverence and
awe. In the case of the white steed, the feeling of awe cannot
be separated from the fact that the horse appeared to the
Indian as a divine creature.
Even in cases where there does not appear to be any sense in
which the object is divine, there is something about the color
white that heightens the experience of terror. For example, the
appearance of an albino man is shocking to the eye. What is
more, it is the pallor of the skin of a dead person that we find
especially appalling. This feeling of dread is something we
attribute to all of our ghosts and phantoms-witness the pale
color of the horse that the figure of Death rides in the
Apocalypse.
Ishmael asks how we are to account for the fact that the color
white serves to intensify the feeling of terror in the experience
of those things we find most terrible. Why, he asks, does the
passing of a white friar or white nun evoke such dread on the
part of an unsophisticated Protestant? Why does the white
tower of London affect the imagination more strongly than the
Byward tower or even the Bloody tower? Why do the White
Mountains of New Hampshire affect our imaginations more
strongly than the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia? Ishmael
concedes that it may not be possible to analyze the cause of
these heightened feelings of terror and dread. Nevertheless,
he insists that there is something about the color white that
serves to heighten these feelings.
Regardless of the fact that Ishmael thinks it is difficult to
provide an analysis of such experiences, I propose to examine
his comments about the whiteness of the whale from the
perspective of Kant's aesthetics of the sublime. My aim in this
next section is to focus on those parts of Kant's analysis that
might help to shed light on Melville's discussion of whiteness.
After we have managed to put enough of Kant's account on

the table before us, I propose to put the Kantian account to
work and attempt to see what might be beneath the surface of
Melville's discussion of the whiteness of the whale.
3. Kant's Aesthetics of the Sublime
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant separates the discussion of
the sublime into two parts. In the first part, he gives an
account of what he calls the mathematically sublime, and in
the second part he gives an account of what he calls the
dynamically sublime. The former deals with the type of
experience that is occasioned by things that appear to be
absolutely large, such as mountains, oceans, and the starry
skies. The latter deals with the type of experience that is
occasioned by those things that appear to be absolutely
powerful, such as large overhanging rocks, lightning and
tornados.
The first point Kant makes is that the experience of the
sublime is initially painful.[8] Later, he tells us that the basis
of the feeling of pain is due to a failure on our part. When we
have an aesthetic experience of something that is extremely
large, such as the ocean, or very powerful, such as a storm, in
which our imagination is under a constraint to bring the
manifold of the experience into totality. Reason imposes the
demand for totality, but it is up to the imagination to meet
that demand in an aesthetic judgment. The problem is that the
imagination isn't up to the task. When the imagination
attempts to bring the manifold of the presentation of an
object, such as the ocean, into totality, it finds that it is unable
to meet the demand. The ocean is just too large, and the
storm is just too powerful for the imagination to bring the
manifold of experience together into unity. In a sense, the
ocean appears to be infinitely large, and the storm appears to
be infinitely powerful.
Kant maintains that, strictly speaking, it is not the object that
is sublime. (pp. 107-113) In the first place, it would be a
mistake to say that many of the objects that give rise to an
experience of the sublime are infinite in size or power. For
example, we can experience the pyramids of ancient Egypt as
sublime even though the pyramids are finite in height. In order
to experience such an object as sublime, we must view the
object from the proper perspective. If we stand too close to
the pyramids, we can see only a small part of a single block. If
we stand too far away, the pyramids as a whole seem quite
small on the horizon. However, when we view them from the
proper perspective, the sheer size of the pyramids seems to
overwhelm our powers of apprehension.
Objects that appear to be absolutely large, such as the oceans
and mountains, make us feel insignificantly small in
comparison. As such, the feeling of pain that we experience
when we are unable, using our imagination, to take it all in,
gives rise to a feeling of insignificance, or despair. Objects
that appear to be absolutely powerful, such as a storm or a
flash of lightning, make us feel powerless in comparison. It is
in the experience of the dynamically sublime that we most
often feel fear. In the face of the overwhelming power of the
storm, we experience the fear that there is nothing we can do
to achieve our human goals. In effect, we seem powerless to
accomplish our aims.

Kant is careful to point out that in cases where we are
overwhelmed with real fear, such as when we find ourselves
caught in the middle of a life threatening storm, it is difficult to
experience the storm as sublime. (pp. 119-123) The reason is
that our judgment of the power of the storm is made in
relation to our real efforts to accomplish our goals, such as the
aim of keeping ourselves out of harm's way. In order to
preserve the aesthetic effect of such experiences, we must
view them from the proper distance. In such cases, we can
aesthetically imagine the threat of the powerful storm, but we
are not overwhelmed by real fear for life and limb.
If this aspect of the experience were all there was to the
sublime, it would be more than just a little puzzling as to why
we find ourselves drawn to such aesthetic experiences. Kant's
answer is that there is more to such an aesthetic judgment
than just a feeling of dissatisfaction with the powers of the
imagination. The inability of the imagination to bring the
manifold of appearance into totality serves as a reminder that
there is something in us that is not overwhelmed. The basis of
our ability to remain undaunted in the face of something that
appears absolutely large is our own power of theoretical reason
and its idea of infinity. Along similar lines, the basis of our
ability to remain undaunted in the face of something that
appears absolutely powerful is our power of practical reason
and the idea of our moral humanity. According to Kant, the
idea of the infinite and the idea of our moral humanity are
ideas that have their origins in our powers of reasoning. (pp
124-6) In the first case, the idea of the infinite is something
that we are able to grasp in virtue of our capacity to construct
a mathematical series for which there is no limit. Or, to take
the other case, the idea of the infinite worth of our moral
humanity is something that we are able to grasp in virtue of
our capacity to impose moral principles on our own conduct.
The primary reason we find the experience of the sublime so
attractive is that the initial feelings of repulsion lead us to
reflect on the infinite character of our own powers of
reasoning. As a result, the initial feelings of pain are converted
into feelings of pleasure. The pain we feel when we realize that
our imagination is unable to bring the experience into totality
leads to a feeling of satisfaction in our power of reason. Upon
reflection, the imagination seems limited in its powers, but
reason has its own aspect of infinitude. As such, we take
pleasure in reflecting upon this comparison between
imagination and reason. The finitude of the imagination is
counterbalanced by the infinitude of our reason. We are aware
that this is the proper relation between the two powers
because it is our reason, and not the power of the imagination,
that is the basis of our true vocation as moral agents.
For Kant, the differences between the experience of beauty
and the experience of the sublime leads us to think of nature
in very different terms. In the experience of natural beauty, we
take pleasure directly in the object. We have a sense that the
natural object seems to possess an underlying beauty that is
well proportioned to our power of imagination. It sets our
imagination into free play. The unity of the natural object is
reflected in the harmony between imagination and reason. The
experience of the natural beauty leads us to assume that
nature as a whole is well suited for us. In effect, we are led to

assume that nature is on our side in our attempt to realize our
vocation as moral agents.
In the experience of the sublime, the objects of nature initially
lead us to feel pain. We have a sense that the natural object is
contra-purposive for our power of imagination. Because the
object seems to be absolutely large or powerful and our power
of imagination is unable to bring the presentation of the object
into totality, we initially have a sense that nature threatens to
overwhelm us. The finitude of the imagination in the
experience of the sublime leads us to reflect on the powers of
reason. Because we are aware that reason has its own ideas of
the infinite, including the idea of our moral humanity, the
experience of the sublime offers a very different moral
education. In the experience of the sublime, we are led to
assume that nature is not well suited for us but, morally
speaking, we are superior to its power. Despite nature's ability
to frustrate our attempt to realize any contingent end that we
might pursue, the freedom of our will is not diminished.
4. The Transition from Simple Fear to Terror
Ishmael's discussion of whiteness clearly includes examples
that fall within Kant's classification of both the mathematically
and the dynamically sublime. The central example of the
book--that of the great white whale-is an example that fits
within both categories of the sublime. The whale is the largest
the whaling men of the Pequod have ever seen. What is more,
the whale has a reputation as the most powerful beast that
any whaler has ever dared to fight.
If we examine Ishmael's discussion of whiteness from the
perspective of Kant's aesthetics of the sublime, a number of
points come to the fore. The most striking point is that the
whiteness of the polar bear, the snow capped mountains, and
the combers on the ocean serve, in each case, to transform
the natural feelings of fear into an overwhelming feeling of
terror. In Melville's own words, the whiteness is the
"intensifying agent" in those terrible things that makes them
seem infinitely large and infinitely powerful.[9] This aspect of
the experience is precisely what is needed, on Kant's account,
to transform the feelings of fear into an aesthetic experience
of the sublime. The reason is that something gives rise to an
experience of the sublime only if we are capable of seeing it as
infinitely large or infinitely powerful.
Like Kant, Melville is careful to point out that this is largely a
matter of perspective. For some people, especially those who
seem to be relatively immune to an active imagination, the
white-capped mountains of the Andes are fearful but they are
not terrifying. For example, the native Indians of Peru, who
happen to live at the base of those very mountains, may
acknowledge the fearful character of the inhuman solitude of
those peaks but they do not experience dread at the sight of
those mountains. Similarly, a sailor who is approaching land
might experience fear at the sight of white breakers. Yet the
result of that fear is not a feeling of dread but vigilance in
sounding the bottom to make sure that the ship does not end
up on those rocks. In both cases, the native Indians and the
sailors have a healthy fear of those things that might cause
them harm but they do not experience terror.

This is very different from the experience of the sailor who is
out at sea, far from any shore, who sees a midnight sea of
milky whiteness. In such a case, the sailor does experience
terror. But it is not clear why the sailor feels such dread.
Ishmael's explanation is that the whiteness of the deep sea at
night is like a "shrouded phantom" that is as "horrible to him
as a real ghost." (ch. 42) Ishmael's contention is that there is
something about the whiteness of such objects that transforms
our experience into a feeling of terror. My suggestion is that
the whiteness of the object activates our imagination and
makes it seem as if the object were infinite. Consequently,
there is something about the whiteness of the artic albatross,
and the whiteness of great steed of the prairies, and the
whiteness of Moby Dick that makes them seem infinite and
beyond the abilities of our imagination to comprehend.
This is precisely the point the Ishmael makes at the end of the
chapter when he tries to answer the question of why the color
white serves to intensify such experiences. His initial
suggestion is that the indefiniteness of the color serves to
shadow forth "the heartless voids and immensities of the
universe" (ch. 42). Besides that fact that the Milky Way is
white, what is it about the color white that might serve to
heighten the feeling of infinity in an experience?
Ishmael considers three possibilities. First, the infinity of the
universe is a reminder of our own finitude. As such, it is a
constant reminder that, at some point in the future, each and
every one of us will suffer annihilation. Second, the color white
is, at one and the same time, both the lack of all color and the
concrete manifestation of all colors. As a consequence, the
color white seems to be a "dumb blankness, full of meaning."
Third, he asks us to consider the theory of the natural
philosophers, such as Locke and Kant, that all colors are
merely secondary properties that do not inhere in substances
themselves. On this view, all colors are merely properties that
are laid onto the objects of our experience as they appear to
us in perception. Consequently, all colors are but "deceits" and
"all deified Nature absolutely paints like the harlot." (ch. 42)
Taking these three points together, they make the universe as
a whole appear palsied like a leper. We can help to draw out
the significance of Ishmael's conclusion if we consider one of
the central differences between the beautiful and the sublime.
In the experience of the beautiful, it is the underlying unity of
the appearance of the object that draws our attention. The
beauty of the rose consists in the relation among all of its
parts-its petals, stem, leaves, and odor-such that all of the
parts come together to form a whole. In an aesthetic
evaluation of the beauty of the rose, each of the parts seems
to us to be just the way it ought to be in relation to the large
whole. The same is true of works of fine art, such as the
beauty of a poem or a novel.
The experience of the sublime, on the other hand, is markedly
different. In the experience of the overwhelming size of the
mountains, or the overwhelming power of a storm, it is not the
underlying unity of the objects that comes to mind. Rather, we
experience the sublime especially in those things that seem to
exhibit a lack of order. According to a Kantian account of the
sublime, it is the chaos of the experience that makes it seem

like an abyss for our power of imagination. These are the same
features that Ishmael tries to focus our attention upon in the
conclusion of the chapter. The color white seems to remind us
that, despite the beautiful appearances on the outside, there is
an underlying lack of order beneath the surface.
5. An Objection to the Kantian Account
In this section, my aim is to use points from Melville's
discussion of the whiteness of the whale as a basis for making
an objection to the Kantian analysis of the sublime. In order to
explain the point of the objection, let us consider two
observations that Kant makes about the experience of the
sublime. According to Kant, a judgment of sublimity should
lead us to attribute a higher rank to the general over the
statesman. Unlike the statesman, who stands for the pursuit
of political interests and the art of making compromises, the
general stands for courage and strength. In a similar fashion,
Kant also maintains that a judgment of sublimity should lead
us to attribute a higher rank to war than peace. The reason is
that war brings out what is most noble in human beings. It
forces us to rise up above our personal interests and to fight
for a higher cause. Peace, on the other hand, tends to
enhance a merely commercial spirit.
It seems clear that Melville's discussion of Captain Ahab is
designed to highlight a similar point. Captain Ahab is the
general of the ship who is leading his troops into battle against
the army of the sperm whale. This army of whales is led by
the most powerful of all sperm whales--Moby Dick. Unlike the
leaders of commerce back in New Bedford who are primarily
concerned about making money, Ahab is committed to a
higher purpose. In seeking revenge against the great white
whale, his aim is to take the case of man to the bar.
Those who stay on land and those who run from the sea to
port seek safety and comfort. But Ishmael maintains that the
port is pitiful (ch. 23). Those who retreat to the shore from the
howling storm crawl, like worms, back to safety of land. Only
those who head out to the open sea are in a position to seek
the highest truth, because Ishmael maintains that "all deep
earnest thinking is but the intrepid effort of the soul to keep
open the independence of her sea, while the wildest winds of
heaven and earth conspire to cast her on the treacherous,
slavish shore." Ahab exemplifies the difference between these
two attitudes when he tells the first mate that he does not
care for the riches to be had from a successful whaling
voyage. The only thing aim that matters on his voyage is
waging war against Moby Dick.
Up to this point, Kant and Melville seem to agree that an
evaluation of the sublimity of each case should lead us to rank
the general over the statesman and war over peace. At this
point, however, the agreements end, because Kant adds two
qualifications to his assessment of the general and war. On
Kant's account, we can only hold the general in high esteem if
he is courageous in battle, and also capable of being civil when
in society. The general must constrain his actions by the laws
of the land and respect the rights of the people. In a similar
vein, Kant maintains that we can only hold war in high esteem
if it governed by a just cause. (p. 122)

The qualifications in Kant's estimation of the sublimity of both
generals and wars are grounded in philosophical commitments
in his underlying analysis. As we have seen, Kant maintains
that the basis of our nobility in the face of things that would
appear to overwhelm us is our power of reason. In the case of
the dynamically sublime, he insists it is our moral humanity
that is the root of our nobility. When the whalers of the
Pequod go to war against the Moby Dick, they face an enemy
that possesses a power that appears to be limitless. In
comparison to the power of the whale, the strength of single
human being, or even the combined strength of the entire
crew, seems miniscule.
According to Ishmael, it is the whiteness of the whale that
gives rise to special feelings of terror. More terrible than the
size of the whale, and more terrible than its apparent
strength, the whiteness of the whale infuses it with aspects of
infinitude. Instead of confronting a merely mortal whale, they
go to battle against a spiritual power that symbolizes the
abyss of death and annihilation. What inspires them to pursue
such a formidable enemy is Ahab. As the captain of the ship, it
was his intention to pursue the whale, and he was the agent
who inspired the members of the crew to form a pact and
head into battle.
On the one hand, the commitment of whalers to follow their
general into war seems to fit the terms of Kant's analysis quite
nicely. After all, they are following a general and not a
statesman, and they are leaving the peace and security of
land and deliberately choosing to head onto the open sea and
to engage in war with Moby Dick. In general terms, the war
against the whale clearly symbolizes a presumption that man
faces a hostile nature. In this case, the crew of the Pequod is
inspired to challenge nature's mastery over us. By engaging
the whale in battle, they assert their independence from
nature. On the other hand, Ahab is not a model of civic virtue,
and the war does not appear to be a model of a just fight. As
Starbuck maintains, the decision to purse Moby out of a desire
for revenge cannot be justified. When Ahab and Moby Dick
engaged in battle some years earlier, the whale took Ahab's
leg. However, the whale is nothing more than a dumb brute
that acted from natural instincts. It was not a vengeful
creature acting from a capricious impulse to harm Ahab. As
such, it is blasphemy against nature itself to seek revenge
against the whale for the loss of Ahab's leg.
Ahab does not accept Starbuck's argument. What Moby Dick
means to Ahab is the personification of the impersonal powers
in nature. The purpose in seeking revenge against these unjust
powers is to take the case of man to bar. In taking the case of
man to the bar, Ahab represents the queenly powers of the
individual personality:
No fearless fool now fronts thee. I own thy
speechless, placeless power; but to the last gasp
of my earthquake life will dispute its
unconditional, unintegral mastery in me. In the
midst of the personified impersonal, a personality
stands here. Though but a point at best;
whencesoe'er I came, wheresoe'er I go; yet while
I earthly live, the queenly personality lives in me,

and feels her royal rights. But war is pain and
hate is woe.[10]
Ahab is driven by a desire for revenge. But the battle against
the whale is a battle against the destructive forces of nature.
The point of the battle is that Ahab refuses to be overwhelmed
by the apparent magnitude of such forces. The strength of will
necessary to challenge the whale is symbolic of the strength
necessary to assert the nobility of human beings in the face of
the impersonal and destructive powers of nature.
I would like to point out that, according to the narrator, Ahab
was shaped by his first encounter with the whale. When Ahab
lunged at Moby Dick from his whaling boat with nothing more
than a knife in his hand, and the whale tore his leg from his
body, it was as if Ahab had been struck by lightning. The
marks of this transformation are the shock of white hair that
was left on Ahab's head and the white peg leg that was carved
from the bone of the whale. The first battle with the whale and
the loss of Ahab's leg was an event that transformed Ahab
from a mere captain of a whaling ship into a general ready to
lead his troops in a prolonged war against Moby Dick. The
result is that Ahab himself comes to personify the nobility of
human beings in the face of the destructive forces of nature.
In effect, he stands for the very thing that, in Melville's
opinion, is necessary for us to maintain our strength in the
face of what appears sublime.
What is necessary is not moral virtue. That is illustrated by
Starbuck's loss of virtue at the end of the novel. As the first
mate of the ship, he felt a moral obligation to save the crew
from the blasphemy of the captain. At one point, Starbuck had
the opportunity to avert disaster by taking a gun from Ahab's
quarters and seizing control of the ship. But, in the end, Ahab's
will proved to be too strong for Starbuck's virtuous character.
Ishmael cautions us against judging Starbuck too harshly for
his failure of virtue. Despite the fact that Starbuck is put
forward as the very model of virtue and prudence, we should
never have expected the moral character of a person such as
Starbuck to withstand the strength of will of a person such as
Ahab.
One might accept this point and insist--contrary to the reading
I am attempting to develop--that I am judging Ahab too
harshly when I point to the amorality of his character and
actions. It is clear that Ahab challenges the type of Christian
morality that for which Starbuck stands as a model. But one
might suggest it is quite possible that Ahab stands for a
different type of moral commitment.[11] The reason that I
reject such a reading is that Ahab himself maintains that his
pursuit of the whale is beyond the requirements of morality.
For instance, he agrees that "there is a sort of fair play that
governs all of creation," but in the same passage he insists
that no even that fair play stands over him.
Despite the fact that Ahab is not a model of civic virtue, and
despite the fact that his war against the whale is not a model
of a just war, I believe that Ahab's and the war both exemplify
the experience of the sublime.
What argument do I have against the Kantian assumption?
The main argument I have to offer is the following: By the

terms of Kant's own analysis, the main proof in such a dispute
about the aesthetics of the sublime is the very aesthetic
judgments that we make. When I evaluate Captain Ahab and
the war against Moby Dick in aesthetic terms, I find them to
be sublime-despite Kant's reservations. In turn, I suggest that
you judge them for yourself.
6. Melville and Contemporary Art
In this final section, I would like to examine one lesson that
we might draw from Melville's account of the whiteness of the
whale for contemporary discussions of art. Some contemporary
discussions of Melville's literary art reveal a bias towards the
Kantian assumptions. For instance, a number of interpreters
assume that the figure of Ahab should be used primarily to
make a political point. In their eyes, Ahab is an immoral leader
who issues commands as a political despot.[12] He is a
dictator who rules his ship with an iron fist, never giving a
thought to the safety of the crew or even the financial
interests of the owner's of the ship. On a Kantian analysis of
the sublime, Ahab fails to represent the nobility of human
beings because, as a leader, he fails to exhibit the proper civic
virtues.
The primary suggestion I want to make for the contemporary
discussion of the sublime is that it is a mistake to unduly
constrain our aesthetic evaluations by moral or political
concerns. The suggestion I am making has implications for the
larger debate about the proper relationship between art, on
the one hand, and moral and political interests, on the other.
Many assume that art fails to serve its proper function if it
does not make the proper moral or political point. I believe
that such an attitude is grounded on a mistake. Like Kant, I
believe that an appreciation of the beauty of both nature and
fine art requires that we set aside any interests-including and
moral or political interests--that might unduly bias our
judgments.
Where I disagree with the Kantian account is in the analysis of
the sublime. It is a mistake, I believe, to place undue moral
constraints on the experience of the sublime. Like nature, art
can give rise to an experience of the sublime even if it
represents powers that are wholly destructive and threaten our
very existence. Despite what Kant claims, it is not necessary
for a work of art, such as a literary depiction of a whaling
captain, to portray the characters as having civic virtue in
order for us to find the art sublime.
Robert Motherwell, who explicitly cites Moby Dick as a major
inspiration for his own painting, states that, like Melville, the
painters of his generation express an attitude that is
"rebellious, individualistic, unconventional, sensitive, irritable .
. . . This attitude arose from a feeling of being ill at ease in the
universe. . . . Nothing as drastic an innovation as abstract art
could have come into existence, save as consequence of a
most profound, relentless, unquenchable need." This feeling is
similar to the "damp drizzly November in his soul" that
Ishmael describes at the outset of the voyage. In an
introduction to a 1950 exhibition, Motherwell describes his art
in the following terms.
The chemistry of pigments is interesting: ivory

black, like bone black, is made from charred
bones or horns, carbon black is the result of
burnt gas, and the most common whites . . . are
made from lead, and are extremely poisonous on
contact with the body. Sometimes I wonder,
laying in a great black stripe on the canvas, what
animal bones (or horns) are making the qualities
as no painter could except in his medium. . . .
The black grows deeper and deeper, darker and
darker before me. It menaces me like a black
gullet. . . . Only love-for painting, in this
instance-is able to cover the fearful void. A fresh
white canvas is the void, as is the poet's sheet of
blank white paper. But look for yourselves, I want
to get back to my white washed studio. If the
amounts of black and white are right, they will
have condensed into quality, into feeling.[13]
The point Motherwell is making is directly analogous to the
point Melville makes in his discussion of the whiteness of the
whale. The color white serves to heighten the feelings of terror
we experience in the face of something that is large and
threatening. The color transforms ordinary feelings of fear into
the terror that is indicative of the sublime. My suggestion is
that, in judging the sublimity of such works of art, we should
hesitate before imposing any undue moral or political
constraints on our evaluation. After all, the ability of art to
help us confront the "fearful void" may depend upon its
independence from just such constraints.
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